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ome of the most efective means of combating housing dis-
crimination are statutes prohibiting discrimination against 
certain protected minority classes. The federal Fair Hous-
ing Act (FHA) represents a model for such statutory prohibitions. 
The FHA prohibits discrimination by both public (e.g., state and 
local government agencies) and private (e.g., landlords and real 
estate brokers) actors on the basis of race, religion, national ori-
gin, sex, family status, or disability. Following a US Supreme Court 
decision in the 1970s, proof of intent to discriminate became a 
prerequisite to bringing an action under the US Constitution’s 
14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Vill. 
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
But a suit under the FHA does not need to demonstrate such 
intent. For decades, the federal circuit courts of appeals have sus-
tained dozens of lawsuits claiming discrimination based simply 
on the disparate impact of government or private actions on one 
of the protected classes.
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In 2015, the Supreme Court airmed 
the use of disparate impact claims 
under the FHA in Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Afairs v. Inclu-
sive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507 (2015), notwithstanding that 
disparate impact or efect is not explic-
itly mentioned in the FHA. But the 
Court hedged the application of dis-
parate impact claims with so many 
caveats and restrictions that many fed-
eral courts have ruled against parties 
bringing these claims, many of which 
would have prevailed before Inclusive 
Communities.
This article addresses the historical 
problem of discrimination in housing, 
and the use of the FHA as a remedy. 
It concludes with a summary of how 
federal courts have addressed dispa-
rate impact claims following Inclusive 
Communities. For a more extensive treat-
ment of this topic, see David L. Callies & 
Derek B. Simon, Fair Housing, Discrimi-
nation, and Inclusionary Zoning in the 
United States, 49 Urb. Law. 687 (2017); 
and David L. Callies & Derek B. Simon, 
Fair Housing, Discrimination and Inclu-
sionary Zoning in the United States, 4 J. of 
Int’l and Comp. L. 39 (2017).
Fair Housing and Discrimination  
in Housing
Discriminatory Intent
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided 
Arlington Heights, which held that the 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause 
provides relief in cases that involve 
discrimination in housing, but only 
if the plaintif alleging discrimination 
can demonstrate that the local or state 
government defendant intends to dis-
criminate against the plaintif. Relying 
primarily on its decision in Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), decided 
ater the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
but before oral argument in Arlington 
Heights, the Court reiterated that oicial 
action would not be held unconstitu-
tional solely because it resulted in a 
racially disproportionate impact. In lan-
guage as plain as can be imagined, the 
Arlington Heights Court held that  
“[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent 
or purpose is required to show a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. 
at 265. Absent that showing, the Court 
said, the Seventh Circuit’s inding of 
a “discriminatory ‘ultimate efect’ is 
without independent constitutional sig-
niicance.” Id. at 271. This decision laid 
the foundation for disparate impact 
claims under the FHA to become one 
of the most prevalent mechanisms 
for ighting modern-day housing 
discrimination.
he FHA and Disparate Impact
In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA 
“following the urban unrest of the mid-
1960s and the chaotic atermath of 
the assassination of the Rev. Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr.” H.R. Rep. No. 711, 
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988). The 
FHA’s goal, as stated within its statutory 
text, is “to provide, within constitu-
tional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3601. In 1968, Senators Celler and 
Mondale articulated Congress’s ambi-
tious belief that the FHA’s proscription 
of discriminatory housing practices 
would “remove the walls of discrimina-
tion which enclose minority groups” 
and “replace ghettos with truly inte-
grated and balanced living patterns.” 
114 Cong. Rec. 9563 (1968) (statement 
of Sen. Celler); 114 Cong. Rec. 3422 
(1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
The thrust of the FHA is found 
within its two primary substantive pro-
visions. First, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) makes 
it unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent 
ater the making of a bona ide ofer, or 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental 
of, or otherwise make available or deny, 
a dwelling to any person because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, 
or natural origin.” Second, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3606(b) makes it unlawful to “discrim-
inate against any person in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision 
of services or facilities in connection 
therewith because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, familial status, or natural 
origin.”
Today, the FHA protects the follow-
ing classes and no others (in particular, 
there is no per se protection for eco-
nomic status): race, color, religion, sex 
(but not sexual orientation), family sta-
tus, national origin, and handicapped 
status.
Disparate Impact and Its Emergence 
Under the FHA
Before Inclusive Communities, the 
Supreme Court had recognized and 
upheld disparate impact claims under 
a number of statutes, including Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), 
the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ori-
gins of disparate impact claims can be 
traced to the Court’s decision in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
In Griggs, an employer implemented 
new policies that required prospective 
employees, except for the company’s 
labor department (or current employ-
ees seeking to transfer departments), 
to have a high school education and 
to pass two professionally prepared 
aptitude tests to be eligible for employ-
ment. Id. at 427-28. Although the new 
policies were facially neutral, the Court 
nevertheless found that they violated 
Title VII because of the long history of 
inferior education received by African 
Americans and because the employer 
failed to establish that either require-
ment had a demonstrable relationship 
to successful job performance. Id. at 
431.
Griggs provided the analytical frame-
work for the decision in United States v. 
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 
1974), which signaled the emergence 
of disparate impact claims under the 
FHA. In Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit 
considered whether a zoning ordinance 
that prohibited the construction of new 
multi-family dwellings violated the 
FHA. See id. at 1182. The Eighth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s determina-
tion that the ordinance did not have a 
discriminatory efect and held that the 
lower court failed to take into account 
“either the ‘ultimate efect’ or the ‘his-
torical context’ of the City’s actions.” Id. 
at 1186. Having found that the plain-
tifs established a prima facie case of 
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disparate impact, the court shited the 
burden to demonstrate that its conduct 
was necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest to the city. See 
id. at 1182, 1186. The court ultimately 
invalidated the ordinance and found 
there was no factual basis to support 
the city’s assertion that its profered 
interests were furthered by the ordi-
nance. See id. at 1187-88.
Inclusive Communities Project
Background and Lower Court 
Decisions
In March 2008, Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc. (ICP) iled suit against 
the Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Afairs (TDHCA) alleging 
discrimination under the FHA. Inclu-
sive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas 
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Afairs, 860 F. 
Supp. 2d 312, 313-314 (N.D. Tex. 2012) 
(Inclusive Communities Project I). ICP is 
a non-proit organization dedicated 
to achieving racial and socioeconomic 
integration in the Dallas metropoli-
tan area. TDHCA, according to Texas’s 
Government Code, is the agency vested 
with the responsibility of administering 
the federal government’s Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) program 
in Texas. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2306.053(b)
(10). Under the LIHTC program, the fed-
eral government provides tax credits to 
developers of low-income housing 
that the developers can then sell to 
inance construction of the low-income 
projects.
ICP alleged that TDHCA improp-
erly exercised its discretion in making 
decisions regarding the allocation of 
the tax credits by allocating the credits 
in a manner that had a discriminatory 
efect on African American residents. 
See Inclusive Communities Project I, 860 
F. Supp. 2d at 317, 322. Speciically, ICP 
contended that TDHCA was dispro-
portionately approving tax credit units 
for developments in predominantly 
minority neighborhoods and dispropor-
tionately disapproving tax credit units 
for developments in predominantly 
Caucasian neighborhoods. See Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of 
Hous. & Cmty. Afairs, 747 F.3d 275, 278 
(5th Cir. 2014) (Inclusive Communities 
Project II). The consequence, according 
to ICP, was the continued concentra-
tion of afordable units in minority 
neighborhoods, a lack of such units in 
Caucasian neighborhoods, and the per-
petuation of the housing segregation 
that the FHA seeks to end. Id.
In 2012, the district court found 
that ICP successfully proved a prima 
facie case of disparate impact under 
the FHA, although it failed on its claims 
of intentional discrimination. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t 
of Hous. & Cmty. Afairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 
at 319-22 (N.D. Tex. 2012). On appeal, 
review was limited to a single issue: 
“[W]hether the district court correctly 
found, that ICP proved a claim of viola-
tion of the [FHA] . . . based on disparate 
impact.” Inclusive Communities Project II, 
747 F.3d at 280.
Ater the district court’s decision, 
the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) issued regulations 
codifying disparate impact under the 
FHA. Adopting HUD’s burden-shiting 
approach, the Fith Circuit reversed and 
remanded the case back to the district 
court for application of HUD’s regula-
tions, given its “demonstrated expertise 
with [the] facts.” Id. at 283. On Octo-
ber 2, 2014, the Supreme Court granted 
THDCA’s petition for writ of certiorari, 
which presented to the Court the ques-
tion of whether disparate impact claims 
were cognizable under the FHA. Inclu-
sive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2513.
Supreme Court Decision: Disparate 
Impact Saved? Maybe
When the Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Inclusive Communities on 
June 25, 2015, it came as no surprise 
that the Court found disparate impact 
claims cognizable under the FHA. 
Eleven federal circuit courts of appeals 
opinions had previously done so, and 
the Supreme Court itself had similarly 
done so in cases brought under the 
ADEA, ADA, and Title VII. What is par-
ticularly signiicant, however, is the 
likely lasting efect the Court’s decision 
will have on the ability of plaintifs to 
prevail on such claims.
Under Inclusive Communities, the sub-
stantiation of an FHA violation through 
a disparate impact claim requires satis-
faction of a three-prong analysis. First, 
the plaintif must show that a policy 
or practice has a disparate impact on 
a class of persons protected under the 
FHA: race, religion, national origin, 
family status, or handicapped status. 
Second, the defendant must be given an 
opportunity to rebut the charge of dis-
crimination by demonstrating that the 
practice or policy is not for discrimi-
natory purposes but for a benign and 
neutral public goal, purpose, or policy, 
such as protection of the health, safety, 
and welfare of the community. Third, 
the plaintif alleging discrimination 
may still succeed if the plaintif can 
show there are other, less burdensome 
methods to accomplish the benign and 
neutral goals the defendant claims for 
the purposes of the challenged public 
policy.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Inclusive 
Communities concentrated primarily on 
the irst prong, under which a plaintif 
must set forth a prima facie violation of 
the FHA. First, there is no liability if the 
allegation of disparate impact is based 
solely on a showing of statistical dispar-
ity. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 
2523. Second, such statistical disparity 
must also fail if plaintifs cannot point 
to a policy of the ofending government, 
The FHA protects the following classes and 
no others (in particular, there is no per se 
protection for economic status): race, color, 
religion, sex (but not sexual orientation), family 
status, national origin, and handicapped status.
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rather than a single instance of an 
action, having such a statistically dispa-
rate impact. Id. As the Court explained, 
“[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without 
more, establish a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact,” Id. at 2523 (alterations in 
original)(quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)), and a 
“statistical disparity must fail if the plain-
tif cannot point to a defendant’s policy 
or policies causing that disparity.” Id. The 
Court characterized this as a “robust cau-
sality requirement.” Id.
In consideration of the second and 
third prongs, the Court ruled that it 
would be “paradoxical to construe the 
FHA to impose onerous costs on actors 
who encourage revitalizing dilapidated 
housing in our Nation’s cities merely 
because some other priority might seem 
preferable.” Id. at 2523. According to 
Justice Kennedy, “disparate-impact lia-
bility has always been properly limited 
in key respects that avoid the serious 
constitutional questions that might 
arise under the FHA, for instance, if 
such liability were imposed based solely 
on a showing of a statistical disparity.” 
Id. at 2522. Further, “[d]isparate-impact 
liability mandates the ‘removal of 
artiicial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers,’ not the displacement of valid 
governmental policies.” Id. Accordingly, 
“[t]he FHA is not an instrument to force 
housing authorities to reorder their pri-
orities, [but rather] aims to ensure that 
those priorities can be achieved with-
out arbitrarily creating discriminatory 
efects or perpetuating segregation.” Id. 
The opinion further stated that “[i]t  
may also be di cult to establish cau-
sation because of the multiple factors 
that go into investment decisions about 
where to construct or renovate housing 
units.” Id. at 2523-24. Therefore, while 
the Court upheld the use of disparate 
impact claims under the FHA, it also 
unquestionably elevated a plaintif ’s 
burden for substantiating such claims.
Disparate Impact after Inclusive 
Communities
Inclusive Communities on Remand 
and Rehearing
The district court’s treatment of Inclu-
sive Communities on remand from the 
Supreme Court best illustrates how 
lower courts are construing Inclusive 
Communities as elevating the burden 
for plaintifs, particularly at the prima 
facie stage. The court reconsidered 
whether ICP had established a prima 
facie case, noting that it had previously 
granted ICP partial summary judgment 
“without the beneit of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.” Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Hous. 
& Cmty. Afairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 
2015 WL 5916220, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 
8, 2015). Relying upon Justice Kenne-
dy’s “cautionary language,” the court 
concluded that it had not previously 
“give[n] the prima facie requirement 
the same emphasis the Supreme Court 
ha[d] given it.” Id. The court noted that, 
although ICP had not relied solely on 
evidence of statistical evidence alone, 
many of the other sources ICP cited also 
largely relied upon statistical evidence, 
and thus the court arguably had “not 
analyze[d] ICP’s evidence through the 
prism of the ‘robust causality require-
ment’ envisioned by the Supreme 
Court.” Id.
The court further emphasized that 
TDHCA also did not have the ben-
eit of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
Id. at *4. Noting that TDHCA “essen-
tially d[id] not contest ICP’s prima facie 
case,” the court concluded that “TDHCA 
should be permitted to challenge ICP’s 
prima facie showing based on a clearer 
understanding of the requirements 
and consequences of ICP’s establishing 
a prima facie case.” Id. Consequently, 
“the interests of justice and fundamen-
tal fairness require[d] not only that 
ICP’s disparate impact claim be decided 
anew under the burden-shiting regi-
men adopted by HUD and the Fith 
Circuit, but that the court start with 
whether ICP has established a prima 
facie case.” Id.
Upon re-brieing and a fresh round 
of oral arguments, the district court 
held that ICP had failed to establish a 
prima facie violation of the FHA and 
dismissed the entirety of ICP’s dispa-
rate impact claim. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Afairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 
WL 4494322, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 
2016). The court’s decision was not 
based on a single deiciency in ICP’s 
claims, but rather, ICP’s wholesale 
failure to satisfy the newly informed 
disparate impact standard.
First, ICP “failed to point to a speciic, 
facially neutral policy that purportedly 
caused a racially disparate impact.” Id. 
at *6. Speciically, “[b]y relying simply 
on TDHCA’s exercise of discretion in 
awarding tax credits, ICP has not iso-
lated and identiied the speciic practice 
that caused the disparity in the location 
of low-income housing.” Id. Instead, 
ICP relied upon the “cumulative efects” 
of TDHCA’s decision making process 
over a multi-year period, an argument 
that has been rejected as insuicient 
to underlie disparate impact claims in 
other contexts. See id. (citing Anderson 
v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F. 3d 1277, 
1283-85 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
the plaintif in an employment discrim-
ination case unsuccessfully asserted 
that the cumulative efects of the defen-
dant’s employment practices caused a 
racial disparity in promotions). ICP’s 
failure to identify a speciic, facially 
neutral policy also became appar-
ent when the court considered what 
potential remedy would be available 
Even if ICP could establish that a speciic, 
facially neutral policy caused the disparity it 
complained of, ICP failed to prove a statistically 
signiicant disparity suficient to warrant the 
imposition of FHA liability. 
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if ICP were to prevail. According to 
the court, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
requires that “[r]emedial orders in dis-
parate-impact cases . . . concentrate on 
the elimination of the ofending prac-
tice, and courts should strive to design 
race-neutral remedies,” and that “lower 
courts should be careful not to ‘impose 
racial targets or quotas,’ because doing 
so ‘might raise di cult constitutional 
questions.’ Id. (citing Inclusive Communi-
ties, 135 S. Ct. at 2512). In other words, 
“[t]o remedy disparate impact, the court 
must crat a race-neutral remedy that 
removes the ofending practice.” Id. 
at *7. Yet, “[a]lthough ICP complains 
of TDHCA’s exercise of discretion in 
housing decisions, it does not ask the 
court to prohibit TDHCA from using 
its discretion; rather, it asks the court 
to require that TDHCA exercise its dis-
cretion in a speciic way: to desegregate 
housing.” Id. Such a remedy, therefore, 
would not be race-neutral.
Second, the court found that ICP’s 
claim must be dismissed because, 
“regardless of the label ICP places on 
its claim, it [wa]s actually complaining 
about disparate treatment, not disparate 
impact.” Id. (emphasis added). As the 
court explained, “[w]here the plaintif 
establishes that a subjective policy, such 
as the use of discretion, has been used 
to achieve a racial disparity, the plaintif 
has shown disparate treatment.” Id. (cit-
ing Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & 
Davidson Cnty., 2008 WL 3163531, at 
*4-6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2008)). There-
fore, because ICP was not complaining 
about the existence of TDHCA’s dis-
cretion, but rather, how TDHCA was 
exercising such discretion, its claim was 
one of disparate treatment. Id.
Third, the court found that even 
if TDHCA’s use of its discretion is a 
speciic, facially neutral policy, ICP nev-
ertheless failed to establish a causal 
relationship between the exercise of 
that discretion and the racial dispar-
ity claimed. Id. at *8. Noting that Justice 
Kennedy cautioned that “[i]t may be 
di cult [for ICP] to establish causa-
tion because of the multiple factors 
that go into investment decisions about 
where to construct or renovate housing 
units[,]” the court concluded that “ICP 
has not proved that TDHCA’s exercise 
of discretion—and not other factors—
caused the statistical disparity.” Id. at *9 
(alterations in original).
Finally, further buttressing its con-
clusion, the court found that, even 
if ICP could establish that a speciic, 
facially neutral policy caused the dis-
parity it complained of, ICP failed to 
prove a statistically signiicant disparity 
suicient to warrant the imposition of 
FHA liability. See id. at *10. Simply put, 
the court concluded that the evidence 
ICP submitted failed to prove “how the 
statistical disparity would have been 
lessened if TDHCA had no discretion 
to [take the actions that ICP’s claim tar-
geted].” Id.
Other Cases Focusing on ICP’s 
Cautionary Language
The decisions of a signiicant number 
of courts that have confronted FHA dis-
parate impact claims ater the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Inclusive Communi-
ties similarly demonstrate that plaintifs 
now must carry undeniably height-
ened burdens merely to proceed past 
the prima facie stage. Ater a review of 
approximately 50 federal court deci-
sions in the past three years, plaintifs’ 
claims in these cases usually fail (par-
ticularly in the irst two years), for one 
or more of the following reasons: (1) 
failure to satisfy the robust causality 
requirement; (2) inadequate evidence to 
demonstrate a statistical disparity; and 
(3) failure to identify a speciic, facially 
neutral policy.
Decisions in the irst two years follow-
ing Inclusive Communities tended to favor 
defendant government agencies by a 
ratio of about 6 to 1. However, since the 
beginning of 2018, the ratio has changed 
to about 4 to 1, particularly if the alleged 
discriminatory defendant is a public 
(e.g., HUD or similar governmental land-
lord) landlord or a lending institution.
For example, in Paige v. N.Y.C. Hous-
ing Authority, 2018 WL 3863451 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), the plaintifs alleged 
that the New York City Housing Author-
ity’s (NYCHA) failure to inspect and 
remediate lead paint caused or will 
cause a disparate impact on families 
with young children and discourage 
families with young children from 
renting or remaining in NYCHA hous-
ing. Noting the standards set forth in 
Inclusive Communities, the district court 
held that although the plaintifs did not 
ofer statistics, they did allege facts stat-
ing an FHA claim at the pleading stage 
because the plaintifs may be able to 
establish that the NYCHA’s acts caused 
signiicantly adverse or disproportionate 
impact on persons of a particular type—
families with young children. Id. at *5.
Again, in City of Oakland v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 
2018 WL 3008538 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 
2018), the city alleged that Wells Fargo 
ofered mortgage loans to the city’s 
residents on a race-discriminatory 
basis, constituting both intentional 
and disparate impact discrimination. 
The discrimination allegedly caused 
high rates of foreclosures, which heav-
ily afected minority borrowers and 
harmed the city in various ways. Wells 
Fargo iled a motion to dismiss. In its 
discussion, the district court noted the 
requirements for a disparate impact 
claim relying on statistical evidence. 
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The district court determined that 
the city’s allegations drew a suicient 
causal link between the speciic policies 
and practices and the disparate impact 
on minority borrowers for pleading 
purposes. The city therefore success-
fully stated a claim for disparate impact 
discrimination.
Perhaps the most frequently identi-
ied deiciency is the failure to satisfy 
Justice Kennedy’s “robust causality” 
requirement. For example, in Azam 
v. City of Columbia Heights, No. CV 
14-1044 (JRT/BRT), 2016 WL 424966, 
*1 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2016), the plaintif 
alleged that the city’s enforcement of 
its health and safety codes with respect 
to his rental properties “ha[d] the efect 
of making afordable rental dwellings 
unavailable . . . [resulting in] a dispa-
rate impact [on] persons intended to 
be protected by the [FHA].” Id. at *10. 
In granting the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, the district court 
found that the plaintif failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, particularly the “robust cau-
sality requirement” and, in any event, 
failed to submit an alternative practice 
with a lesser impact.
In City of Joliet, Illinois v. New West, 
L.P., 825 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2016), 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the district court’s dismissal of 
the plaintif ’s claim for failing to iden-
tify a speciic, facially neutral policy. In 
that case, the city commenced condem-
nation proceedings against an allegedly 
dilapidated, crime-ridden apartment 
complex that was approximately 95 per-
cent African American. Id. at 829–30. 
Noting Inclusive Communities’ caution 
that “a one-time decision may not be a 
policy at all,” the Seventh Circuit upheld 
the “district court’s indings . . . that the 
condemnation of the complex was a 
speciic decision, not part of a policy 
to close minority housing in Joliet.” Id. 
at 830. The court further noted “gov-
ernmental entities . . . must not be 
prevented from achieving legitimate 
objectives,” and that the city’s condem-
nation was in furtherance of the goals 
approved in Inclusive Communities. Id.
Conclusion
Federal remedies for housing dis-
crimination have a long history in the 
United States. Ater the Supreme Court 
required a showing of intentional dis-
crimination as a prerequisite for a 
constitutional challenge, the emphasis 
for challenging housing discrimination 
shited to the FHA. In a series of federal 
appellate court decisions during the 
past 40 years, federal courts recognized 
recovery under the theory of dispa-
rate impact: no need to show intent 
to discriminate but only that the com-
plained-of action has a discriminatory 
efect on a class (race, religion, gender, 
family status, disability) protected by 
the FHA. It is not particularly surpris-
ing, therefore, that the Supreme Court 
upheld the disparate impact theory in 
Inclusive Communities. But the Court 
hedged its application with so many 
conditions and expressed so many 
concerns that arguably it has become 
signiicantly more di cult for plain-
tifs alleging discrimination to succeed 
than it was before the Court weighed in. 
Such di culty is apparent in the wave 
of federal district court cases approving 
government actions and dismissing dis-
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